By Natalie Cruzat
Abstract
The use of armed drones by the US has increased substantially since 2001, and this growth has strained the ability of policy and policymakers to sufficiently police drone programs. Controversial practices have gained attention over the years, but drone strike policy still lacks the depth and cohesiveness it needs. Many have pondered the problems associated with drone programs, and still others have proposed solutions to these problems. Three steps to better national drone policy stand out: ending signature strikes, implementing greater transparency, and holding decision-makers accountable for civilian deaths.
Background
A drone strike is a type of airstrike committed by an unmanned aerial vehicle, usually referred to as a drone. While the first drones were only for surveillance, the technology was weaponized roughly two decades ago, and their capabilities now include firing missiles and dropping bombs (Plaw et al., 2016). They are hailed as clean and precise instruments of war. Drones are touted as more discerning weapons, able to surveil what is happening on the ground as a missile is fired and to strike with greater accuracy than a standard airstrike (Plaw et al., 2016). There is also no risk to pilots, many of whom are hundreds- if not thousands- of miles away at secure military bases (Plaw et al., 2016). Understandably, the US military has become rather obsessed with drone strikes since 2001; they represent a way to kill high-profile terrorists without sending soldiers into active warzones.
Despite these benefits, however, drone strikes have been controversial since their inception. The legality of the US’s targeted killing program has been heavily debated, especially as drone strikes strayed from areas of armed conflict (Afghanistan and Iraq) to countries the US was not at war with (Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, among others) (Theussen, 2021). The technical precision of these strikes as well as how decisions to strike are made have also come into question as newspapers and NGOs report high numbers of civilian casualties (“Living under Drones…” 2012; Plaw, et al., 2016). The US is notoriously tight-lipped about its drone program, refusing to provide any information on how the program works, how decisions are made, or what structures exist to ensure the safety of civilians and accuracy of intelligence (“Living under Drones…” 2012). This secrecy about the drone program has not stopped accusations that the US has not handled the prevention or assessment of civilian harm appropriately (“‘Will I Be Next?’…” 2013). In some cases, observers have questioned whether the US is perpetrating war crimes in its liberal use of drone strikes. During the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, a strike killed ten civilians- most of whom were children- on the basis of faulty intelligence gathered in a fit of paranoia after a bombing against US troops stationed at Kabul’s airport (Schmitt, Sept 2021). The US then attempted to cover up the disaster, refusing to admit that all killed were civilians (Nelson, 2021; Schmitt, Sept 2021). Though a review has been ordered (Nelson, 2021; Schmitt, Dec 2021) it will presumably be classified; it will be years before the public knows whether or not the strike was a war crime.
Backlash over the Kabul strike has resulted in the current Secretary of Defense ordering full investigations of both botched strikes and declaring that family members will be compensated for the loss of their loved ones (“Statement by Secretary of Defense…” 2021). The Biden administration has substantially restricted the use of drones while the Department of Defense reviews current procedures, with a focus on the prevention of future civilian deaths and recognition of past failures (Shackford, 2021). Notably, the Defense Secretary has also ordered the creation of a Civilian Protection Center “to quickly institutionalize the Pentagon’s knowledge, practices and tools for preventing, mitigating and responding to civilian harm” (Swanson, 2022). However, these actions are not enough. They do not address the real steps that must be taken to ensure the drone program no longer operates with impunity. To do this, the Biden administration must end signature strikes, implement greater transparency, and hold decision-makers accountable for civilian deaths.
Recommendations
Signature Strikes
Signature strikes are perhaps the most controversial element of the drone program as it stands today. These strikes are based on “signatures,” a term that may encompass a group or individual’s movements, known associates, or “suspicious” activity caught on surveillance (Benson, 2014). Certain signatures are associated with terrorist activity (regularly visiting a known al-Qaeda member or training camp, carrying or transporting weapons, etc) and open a person up to being targeted (Heller, 2013). These strikes are controversial because of the innate problem of identifying terrorists based on these signatures. Unlike in personality strikes, where an individual’s identity is known and they are targeted due to intelligence specifically about them (Heller, 2013; Benson, 2014), signature strikes are based on patterns of behavior, which makes them much more unreliable.
The botched Kabul strike mentioned above was a signature strike, and it perfectly represents the problem with these types of strikes. The actions labeled “suspicious” by US intelligence officials were actually a part of the victim Zemari Ahmadi’s daily routine; he was an aid worker who traveled across Kabul on a daily basis (Nelson, 2021; Schmitt, Sept 2021). The military also claims his vehicle was spotted leaving a suspected al-Qaeda safehouse that morning, but coworkers refute those claims, saying he picked up two colleagues and stopped at his boss’s residence (Schmitt, Sept 2021). Because his identity was unknown, details about his life, including that he was a well-known aid worker, were unknown. The danger of targeting civilians who meet the loose criteria of “suspicious” is inherent in signature strikes. Using these strikes, civilian deaths are more likely. If the military does not know who they are killing, they do not know their true role in the conflict- if they even have one. At the very least, signature strikes should be heavily restricted. This paper, however, recommends that they be banned for the risk they represent to civilian lives.
Transparency
Greater transparency is also needed. As it stands, most parts of the drone program are classified (“The Civilian Impact of Drones…” 2012). One area that is particularly opaque is the use of covert drone strikes. Covert drone strikes are those that take place in secret and outside active warzones, and they are usually run by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) (“The Civilian Impact of Drones…” 2012). It is believed that the majority of these strikes have happened in Pakistan, specifically the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (Plaw, et al., 2016). Unlike drone strikes used in conventional military operations, covert strikes are classified and little to no information about them is made public (“The Civilian Impact of Drones…” 2012; Karam and Gray, 2013). What information is known comes primarily from leaks and independent investigations by journalists and watchdog organizations (“The Civilian Impact of Drones…” 2012). Also unlike strikes launched in conventional operations, the procedures taken to ensure that covert strikes are not launched with impunity are shrouded in secrecy as well (Karam and Gray, 2013). Despite assurances from various officials that covert strikes follow the rules of war, there is no way to verify such claims (“The Civilian Impact of Drones…” 2012; “Living under Drones…” 2012) creating even more doubt that covert strikes conform to national and international law. Numerous examples of botched covert strikes have been reported, but little reliable information exists for most of them, especially for those taking place in areas like FATA that are difficult for journalists and watchdog organizations to access (“‘Will I Be Next?’…” 2013; “Living under Drones…” 2012). The vast majority of botched covert strikes receive no acknowledgment, explanation, apology, or compensation from the US government (“‘Will I Be Next?’…” 2013; “Living under Drones…” 2012). This secrecy prevents public scrutiny and facilitates abuses by allowing the US government to ignore its mistakes.
Transparency would not– and should not– jeopardize national security. It is vital to the effective operation of both the CIA and JSOC that certain things remain secret from the general public. However, there is no argument for hiding the measures put in place to assess the need for a strike, ensure civilian safety, or review botched strikes. Such information would only serve to reassure the world that US drone operations meet the requirements of all relevant law. There is also little reason to keep strikes classified years after they actually happen, especially when questions are raised regarding the legality of a specific strike. Without credible information on covert strikes, informed debate cannot take place, and without informed debate, US citizens cannot act as a democratic check on government actions. The government must implement greater transparency in its use of drone strikes, with a particular emphasis on its use of covert strikes.
Accountability
Finally, the greatest change that must be made is in regard to accountability. Decision-makers must be held accountable for civilian deaths with no exceptions. If a decision is made and civilians are killed, a thorough review must be conducted. If that decision is proven to be the wrong one and those civilian deaths were preventable, appropriate consequences must result. Too often, the US is willing to call something a tragic mistake and move on; there are more examples of this than can be listed in this paper (see “Living under Drones…” 2012; “‘Will I Be Next?’…” 2013). To provide just one, officials in the Biden administration have stated that they do not intend to punish anyone for the strike against Zemari Ahmadi that killed him and 9 others, including 7 children (Schmitt, Dec 2021). This is in spite of the fact that the US has a legal obligation to investigate civilian deaths, provide remedy where appropriate, and prosecute violations of the laws of war (“Living under Drones…” 2012). The US government must immediately put in place structures to hold decision-makers accountable, and more importantly, it must abide by them. Anyone found to have recklessly endangered civilian lives in ordering a drone strike should be punished with either career consequences (demotion, probation, termination, etc) or in the most extreme cases, prosecution for war crimes.
This is the most critical reform needed. If accountability measures are not imposed, civilian deaths will continue unabated because decision-makers will not fear the consequences of their actions. The CIA and JSOC in particular must be a focus of this reform. Reports indicate a widespread lack of accountability for both organizations, and it has even been suggested that Congressional oversight of their operations has failed due to a willingness to misrepresent information to the committees charged with overseeing them (“The Civilian Impact of Drones…” 2012). They cannot be afforded the secrecy they require if the government cannot ensure that any abuse of the privilege to launch covert strikes will be harshly punished. In regards to the CIA and JSOC specifically, a full public review should be conducted by Congress to assess whether that secrecy has been abused and where oversight may have failed. These reforms are crucial in terms of justice for victims and their families. Over the past two decades, many have been left wondering if the US has any sympathy for those left behind and whether answers will ever come (“‘Will I Be Next?’…” 2013). The Biden administration has declared its intention to set up a system through which relatives of those killed can receive compensation for their loss (Garamone, 2022) but this is unlikely to be enough. How much a family is compensated is unlikely to truly reflect the loss, especially of a family’s breadwinner, and some families refuse compensation outright (“Living under Drones…” 2012). What these families deserve is justice and genuine assurances that the US will do everything in its power to make sure nothing like what happened to them ever happens again.
Conclusion
These recommendations are simple in theory, but it will take time and dedication to put them into practice. Still, there is no way around them. The drone program must be reformed, and three ways to do that are laid out here. The US government needs to end its use of signature strikes, implement greater transparency of covert strikes, and hold decision-makers accountable for civilian deaths.
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