By Cayden Kirkpatrick
The United States government’s relationship with the Republic of China (Taiwan) has been complex since the establishment of Taiwan’s government in Taipei in 1949 (Harrison 10). One of the main difficulties in these relations stems from Taiwan lacking the official status of an independent country in United States foreign policy. This memo will explore how the United States’ recognition of Taiwan, officially as the Republic of China, would affect Taiwan-United States relations, and the effect this action would have on international politics, notably in relation to the People’s Republic of China (China). Finally, accounting for all of these facts, this memo will make a recommendation to the United States government as to whether or not Taiwan should be recognized.
Before analyzing future actions by the United States, it is necessary to examine Taiwan’s history, and in particular Taiwan’s relationship with the United States. Since the creation of establishment of the current governmental system in 1949, Taiwan and the United States have enjoyed a relatively friendly relationship. While Taiwan was at first viewed as of little geopolitical importance to the United States, with the intensification of the Cold War (and in particular the Korean War), the United States began to take more of an interest in Taiwan starting in the 1950s. As a result, the United States military presence increased in and around Taiwan, and the United States actively sought to develop the Taiwanese economy, providing $1.5 billion in non-military aid from 1951 to 1964 (Rubinstein 325). While the United States still remained a valuable ally of Taiwan by the 1970s, the United States began to accept the continuance of the People’s Republic of China, and the necessity to engage in relations with them. This is perhaps most visible in the foreign policy of Richard Nixon and the replacement of Taiwan (the Republic of China) with the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations Security Council, which led Taiwan to become an unrecognized state (Rubinstein 438). However, under the administration of Lee Tengh-hui, Taiwan strengthened international relationships by seeking international recognition of Taiwan’s status, becoming more involved in trade (in particular in Southeast Asia), and seeing Taiwan-United States relations gradually improve. (Rubinstein 462-465). More recently, there have been calls for greater recognition of Taiwan by the United States across the political spectrum. In particular, the administration of President Trump provided a platform for “China hawks” who advocated for stronger relationships with Taiwan (Wong).
If the United States were to officially recognize Taiwan, this would mean progressing past these historical relationships. One of the guiding documents behind U.S. foreign policy regarding Taiwan is the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. This piece of legislation legally sanctioned defense practices for Taiwan, and is one of the best indicators of U.S. policy on this subject (Library of Congress). Another important document relating to U.S. foreign policy regarding Taiwan are the U.S.-China Joint-Comminqués. For example, the U.S.-China Joint Communiqué of August 17, 1982 clearly set out that the United States would not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state (Ibid). These examples provide guidance on how the United States could recognize Taiwan, if it so chooses. Considering that Taiwan is often considered to be a part of China, the United States government could send an official message to China (like the Joint-Communiqués) indicating that they will consider Taiwan a sovereign nation, and treat them as such in foreign relations. To publicize this policy shift, the Office of the President of the United States could post an official message indicating that the United States would now recognize Taiwan. Finally, another way the United States could recognize Taiwan would be to actively encourage the United Nations to count Taiwan as a member-state.
The United States’ recognition of Taiwan would have serious political effects for the United States, Taiwan, and China. This recognition would evidently be hugely beneficial to the Taiwanese government. The important global status of the United States would no doubt encourage other countries to reconsider recognition of Taiwan. For these states, such an action could signify a devotion to United States foreign policy goals, and as result strengthen their relationships with the United States. In short, the United States’ recognition could have a snowballing effect, and lead Taiwan to gain relatively widespread recognition. With this increased international standing, Taiwan would be able to more effectively participate in and partner with the United Nations and other Non-Governmental Organizations. By bringing Taiwan a seat at the table in these organizations, Taiwan would be able to influence international decisions with a minimal political cost.
The political effects for the United States and China are also important to note. This decision by the United States would be seen by Taiwan as an extension of friendship, and could lead Taiwanese politicians and their government to take a more favorable position towards the United States government, potentially strengthening political ties. The United States could also enhance its international reputation, by acting as a supporter of both market economies and democracy abroad (Zagoria et al. 9). China would face a blow to its “one China” rhetoric, and this would no doubt set off some sort of dilemma within the country’s leadership (Romberg 8). In terms of foreign policy, the most logical response by China would be retaliation. One way in which China could stop such a recognition would be to assert control of Taiwan militarily. China’s recent militaristic actions in regions such as the South China Sea might seem to suggest this would be a likely response (Fangyin 869). While China has a strong enough military to capture Taiwan, the threat of military retribution by the United States and other countries, in addition to an expected international condemnation of the action, would strongly discourage China from actually engaging in war. China would be far more likely to pursue economic retaliation.
China’s economic punishments would likely be severe towards the United States and Taiwan. Focusing on Taiwan first, it is important to recognize that Taiwan maintains important economic ties with mainland China. If the United States were to recognize Taiwan, and Taiwan were to assert its status as a sovereign country, China would likely cut off all trade with Taiwan (at least temporarily). There is no doubt that, barring any additional action, recognition of Taiwan would cripple its economy (Taiwan Depends on Trade with China). To counter this, Taiwan’s economy would need short-term support, which could be found in a number of places, the most plausible of which being United States aid. After Taiwan has normalized its relationship with China, this aid would no longer be necessary, and economic interactions between Taiwan and China would resume.
Figure 1: A chart depicting Taiwan’s reliance on trade with China. Note that as of 2017 over 20% of Taiwan’s trade was with China. (Taiwan Depends on Trade with China)
Immediately following recognition of Taiwan, the United States would experience a sharp economic contraction. China would levy huge sanctions on the United States, and this would no doubt have a serious negative effect on economic activity within the United States. The current “trade-war” between the United States and China has already had severe repercussions for the United States, as China’s tariffs on $110 billion in United States goods has weakened the United States’ economy; the United States could expect far worse following a recognition of Taiwan (Yu 38). In order for the recognition of Taiwan to be worthwhile for the United States, two actions need to be taken. First, the United States would need to mitigate this short-term damage by shoring up relationships with other allied-countries, so that if these countries choose to follow the United States in supporting the independence of Taiwan, the combined unity of these states’ economies could help soften the blow of losing China as a trade partner. Second, the United States would need to acknowledge that the long-term ramifications of Taiwan’s recognition would be net-beneficial. In the long-term, the United States would strengthen its relationship with Taiwan (and by extension gain an important supporter in international organizations) and help reign in China’s geopolitical standing. If the United States were to be successful in gaining international support for Taiwan’s recognition, China would run the risk of finding itself economically isolated if it imposes tariffs on nations acknowledging Taiwan’s sovereignty. This position would be unsustainable, and, due to trade interests in other nations, China would most likely drop or reduce tariffs on other countries who recognize Taiwan after a sufficient period of time has elapsed.
While there are no doubt problems presented by the United States officially recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign entity, such an action is in the best interest of both the United States and Taiwan. Three conditions need to be met in order for United States recognition to occur. First, Taiwan must be willing to accept independence as a separate entity from China. For this to occur, political sentiment should be in favor of parties advocating for the independence of Taiwan; in the current electoral system this party is the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is currently in power (Ching-Hsin 79-80). In addition to the support of the DPP, the majority of Taiwan’s electorate would have to be in favor of official independence, a position potentially made unpopular by China’s retaliatory threats. (Shreer 53-54). Second, domestic United States politics should be somewhat supportive of recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign nation. Given the tense attitudes toward China within the United States, and the demonstrated support of Taiwan by members of both the Democratic and Republican parties, this criteria is currently met (Wong). Finally, the United States must coordinate with other allies in recognizing Taiwan, especially among countries such as Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and France which have historically been supportive of U.S. foreign policy goals (Neack 176, 191-192). Without the explicit recognition of Taiwan by other countries or these countries’ economic assistance, a United States recognition of Taiwan is untenable. However, if all of these conditions can be met, it is in the best interest of both states for the United States to recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country.
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